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"Life is short, the art long, opportunity fleeting, experiment treacherous, judgment difficult,”
Hippocrates once said. On this fiftieth anniversary of the Doctor’s Trial, which charged Nazi
physicians with “crimes against humanity” and violations of Hippocratic ethics in the conduct of
human experimentation, I want to begin with Hippocrates’ observation that to “experiment [is]
treacherous.”
Being aware of medicine’s limited ability to cure and, thus, the temptation to resort to dangerous,
heroic measures, Hippocrates admonished his fellow physicians, “[a]s to diseases, make a habit of
two things – to help, or at least to do no harm.” Hippocrates was not opposed to human
experimentation in the practice of medicine, but in his day physicians experimented primarily to
benefit individual patients, once customary remedies had proven ineffective. 
At the dawn of medical science in the mid-1850s, “experiment treacherous” assumed a dimension
not contemplated by Hippocrates. For the first time, experimentation would extend to countless
patients, not for their direct benefit, but to advance scientific knowledge for the benefit of
mankind. Medicine now held the promise of reversing Hippocrates; aphorism: Life would be
longer, art shorter and science longer, opportunity enduring, judgment easier. To accomplish
these objectives, a new breed of scientific physician-investigators expected their patient-subjects
to make sacrifices on behalf of medical science. Thus, experiment would become even more
treacherous.
The philosopher Hans Jonas, in a remarkable essay on human experimentation, comes close to
equating human experimentation with the “primeval human sacrifices…that existed in some early
societies [for] the solemn execution of a supreme, sacral necessity”; for he suggested that both
involved “something sacrificial [in their] abrogation of personal inviolability and the ritualistic
exposure to gratuitous risk of health and life, justified by a presumed greater social good.”
Whatever the relationship between ancient religious practices of sacrifice as an offering to deity
and scientific research practices of sacrifice as an offering to medical progress, the readiness with
which human sacrifice for the sake of scientific progress has been embraced by the medical
profession is remarkable. As one distinguished surgeon put it: “[Conducting] controlled studies
may well sacrifice a generation of women but scientifically they have merit.”
René Girard, in his book, Violence and the Sacred, observes that “[i]n many rituals the sacrificial
act assumes two opposing aspects, appearing at times as a sacred obligation to be neglected at
great peril, at other times as a sort of criminal activity entailing perils of equal gravity.” The
conflict between medicine and law on the permissible limits of human experimentation, to which I
shall return repeatedly, reflects these “opposing aspects.” When do such “sacred [scientific]
obligations” become a “criminal activity”?
Sacrifice can be voluntary or involuntary. The distinction is crucial. But I shall argue that even
voluntary sacrifice can be safeguarded only if investigators learn that seeking voluntary consent is
their moral obligation, if they learn to desist from employing the concept of voluntary consent as a
deceptive subterfuge to shift moral responsibility for participation in research from themselves to
their patient-subjects.
In my work I have been largely concerned with involuntary sacrifice, which brings to the surface a
conflict inherent in all human research: respect for individual inviolability, on the one hand, and
the pursuit of scientific knowledge for the benefit of mankind, on the other. Exploring this conflict
in the context of the Nazi concentration camp experiments may seem ludicrous, because the
brutality and torture inflicted during these experiments was so immoral that one need not probe
further. Yet, I believe that the doctors’ conduct illuminates, the flames from hell, less egregious
though still troublesome practices that have stalked human experimentation from its beginnings to
this day.
The Nuremberg Code is the one document that seeks in uncompromising language to protect the
inviolability of subjects of research. It deserves to be taken more seriously than it has been by the
research community.
We cannot resurrect the dead, but we can learn from their suffering.
When I received the invitation to speak at Nuremberg, I knew that I had to come. But I did not
realize then how painful it would be to reimmerse myself in a history that is so inextricably
intertwined with my personal and professional life. For what transpired in Nazi Germany has
shaped my life as a person, a physician, and a teacher. In all my work the disadvantaged in our
midst, those stripped of their rights and dignity – the mentally ill, women, children, patients,
research subjects – have always been my people.
I was born in Germany – in a small town Zwickau, Saxony – and lived there until 1938. After a
year in Czechoslovakia, my immediate family escaped to England a few weeks before the invasion
of Poland. Seven months later we arrived in the United States, and I eventually studied medicine
at Harvard Medical School. I was a second-year medical student during the Doctors’ Trial, but it
was never discussed in any lecture or seminar, even though Harvard was a school that encouraged
us to become investigators. Only after I joined the Yale Law School faculty, 39 years ago, did I
learn in any depth about the concentration camp experiments. A few years later, thoughts of those
experiments led me, joined by many students, to a prolonged exploration of the ethical and legal
implications of human experimentation, opening up a field of inquiry then pursued by only a
handful of others.
As soon as I decided to go to Nuremberg, childhood memories flooded my mind: listening on the
radio to Nazi party rallies where Hitler, Hess, Goebbels, and others spoke about my people in
contemptuous and threatening ways. I was then a frightened Jewish boy, scared to go to school,
where I knew I would be vilified and on a few occasions even beaten. I was angry at my parents
for not leaving. They thought that it would all blow over; a “Final Solution” was beyond our
contemplation.
The nightmare is now past; yet its memories are still alive. During the past few months they have
haunted me in my dreams and during many nights when I could not sleep. And this morning they
accompany me to this plenary session at the Nuremberg Opera House.
My problems speaking to you today remain unresolved. They are embedded in my intent to focus
on an aspect of my life’s work that began with what I learned about Auschwitz but then went
beyond the Nazi horrors, to an exploration of physicians’ striking inattentiveness to ethical values
in the conduct of human experimentation before, during, and after the Nazi era. To be sure, at no
time in the annals of human experimentation have physicians conducted experiments on humans
with the sadism witnessed during the darkness of the Nazi period, where, for example, the death
of subjects was an integral part of the research design. 
Thus, in making any comparisons between the Nazi experiments and underlying problems in all
human research, no matter how qualified, in the belief that we must learn from history and that its
darkest moments have much to teach us, would I detract from the “uniqueness” of the suffering of
the millions who were slaughtered, many with the active collaboration of physicians, and of the
thousands who perished in the service of human experimentation? Would I make invidious
comparisons between the conduct of the Nazi physician-investigators and physician-investigators
in the rest of the Western world? I put my questions this starkly because they have haunted me
during the past months.
I believe that the concentration camp experiments, which transgressed the last vestiges of human
decency, can be located at one end of a continuum, but I also believe that toward the opposite
end, we must confront a question still relevant in today’s world: How much harm can be inflicted
on human subjects of research for the sake of medical progress and national survival? Knowledge
about hell can make investigators pause and reflect, as it did at times during the days of the Cold
War, when a few American physician-scientists, while contemplating experiments much less
egregious than those conducted by the Nazi physicians, asked: “Are we beginning to behave as
they did?”
The concentration camp experiments are embedded in the Holocaust, in what happened to my
people, my relatives, Gypsies, homosexuals, political prisoners, and prisoners of war. The
confluence of many forces – including biological science and the ideology of the Nazi state –
made the Holocaust well-nigh inevitable. And physicians’ inattentiveness to the problematics of
Hippocratic ethics and its oath, which had served medicine well in the days of the Greeks and
throughout the Middle Ages but required a thoroughgoing reappraisal at the dawn of the age of
medical science added its own contributions to the Holocaust and the concentration camp
experiments.
Since others at this conference will talk about the Holocaust – the murders committed during the
selections for death or work – I shall address only the human experimentation aspects of the
Holocaust. I do want to underscore, however, that, unlike other historical instances of mass
murder, the Final Solution was carried out by doctors acting as executioners, and that science –
biological science – added its own justifications for the Holocaust and euthanasia as well. How
could physicians behave that way? How could doctors become murderers?
I have no answers. Nor have I read any that satisfy me. Robert Lifton, in his pioneering book, The
Nazi Doctors, suggests that an explanation can be found in the psychological principle of
“doubling: the division of the self into two functioning wholes, so that a part-self acts as an entire
self [an Auschwitz self and a non-Auschwitz self].” “The Nazi doctors’ immersion in the healing-
killing paradox,” Lifton says, “was crucial in setting the tone for doubling,” leading doctors to
“[subvert] medicine from a practice of healing to a science of killing. Nazi medicine was not just
corrupted, it was inverted.”
“Doubling,” however, is an all too human phenomenon. Indeed, it is a ubiquitous manifestation of
man’s conflictual nature. And physician-investigators are particularly susceptible to the perils of
doubling. In their scientific pursuits doctors are double agents, because their commitment to the
objective imperatives of the research protocol conflicts with, and can take precedence over, the
individual needs of patients. Thus, in human research, the healing-harming-(killing) “paradox” is
inherent in the task itself.
Let me note only in passing that with regard to euthanasia, “the healing-killing paradox” is
graphically illustrated in an article published in 1941 in the American Journal of Psychiatry by a
Cornell Medical School professor, who recommended that “hopelessly unfit children – nature’s
mistakes – should be killed, and the less unfit [sterilized]” so that “thereafter civilization will pass
on and on in beauty.” The Nazis began by killing their own “defectives’ and then went on to
killing Jews and Gypsies, whom they also considered biologically “defective.”
I continue to find it inexplicable, despite the many explanations that have been advanced, that
involuntary sacrifice, with physicians’ active participation or passive acquiescence, went so totally
out of control at Auschwitz. Can one say more than Erasmus did: Homo homini aut deus aut
lupus (Man is to man either a god or a wolf)? Do we romanticize physicians too much when we
wish to exclude them from Erasmus’ dictum? Must we recognize, for the sake of the future, that
the ingredients for what happened at Auschwitz are inherent in the conduct of research and that
we must learn to control it better at its source?
Let me turn to the Doctors’ Trial. I shall relate it in two parts. First, I will describe two
experiments most briefly; and then, after a few comments on the history of medical ethics, I will
analyze the tribunal’s judgment and its implications for the future conduct of human research.
The Doctors’ Trial was the first of twelve trials that followed the Nuremberg trial of the major
war criminals by the International Allied Military Tribunal. Conducted by American judges, the
Doctors’ Trial focused on experimentation on human beings during the Nazi regime. Evidence on
the experiments was presented over many months in excruciating detail. I have reviewed the
record many times and still find it devastatingly painful to read.
Most notorious among the experiments was Dr. Sigmund Rascher’s work on the effects of high
altitude on human survival. On May 15, 1941, Rascher wrote to Heinrich Himmler: “[During] a
medical selection course [in which] research on high altitude flying played a prominent part [we
learned that English fighter planes were able to reach higher ceilings than we could]. Regret was
expressed that no experiments on human beings have so far been possible…because such
experiments on human beings are very dangerous and nobody is volunteering. I therefore put the
serious question: Is there any possibility that two or three professional criminals can be made
available for these experiments?…The experiments in which the experimental subject of course
may die…are absolutely essential…and cannot be carried out on monkeys, because monkeys offer
entirely different test conditions…” Dr. Rudolf Brandt, on behalf of Himmler, responded
promptly: “I can inform you that prisoners will, of course be gladly made available for the high-
flight researches…I want to use the opportunity to extend to you my cordial wishes on the birth
of your son…”
In Rascher’s report on one of these experiments, he described in graphic detail “the fate of a 37-
year-old Jew in good general condition who, at ever increasing altitudes, began to perspire, to
wiggle his head, [and to suffer from severe] cramps . Breathing increased in speed and [he]
became unconscious…Severest cyanosis developed…and foam appeared at the mouth. After
breathing had stopped [an electrocardiogram] was continuously written until the action of the
heart had come to a complete standstill. One half hour [later] dissection was started.” 
The freezing experiments, many fatal, were even more brutal, if that is possible. The subjects were
immersed in ice water for hours on end. They pleaded to be shot to escape their unbearable
agony. As I read these accounts, I could almost hear their agonizing pleas. These and the many
other experiments, conducted at Auschwitz and elsewhere, bear testimony to the brutality inflicted
on “lives not worth living” and therefore expendable.
Rascher, in his report, was delighted that the heart actions he had recorded “will [prove to be of]
particular scientific interest, since they were written down with an electrocardiogram to the very
end.” For him the experiment represented another triumph in the 100-year history of human
sacrifice for the sake of the advancement of knowledge.
Experimentation with human beings antedates the Nazis. Its roots go back to antiquity, but in the
1850s, human research increased in magnitude unprecedented during the millennia of medical
history. Academic physicians observed with envy the discoveries in physics and chemistry that had
resulted from systematic, objective investigations, and they adopted the methodologies of the
physical sciences so that medicine would also become a respected scientific discipline. At the
same time, doctors lost sight of the fact that it is one thing to experiment with atoms and
molecules and quite another to do so with human beings. Once, while reflecting on the inhumanity
of Auschwitz, my thoughts took me back to these beginnings of medical research. I was struck by
how quickly physicians accepted these new ways of conducting research with human beings,
never asking whether fellow human beings, particularly patients, should be subjected to these
novel practices and , if so, with what safeguards.
The initial advances in knowledge that resulted from such scientific investigations, which
promised to alleviate human suffering to an extent previously unknown, seemed to justify the
means employed. The uncharted moral path led only once to Auschwitz; yet, on many other
occasions down the road, human beings would pay a considerable price for the sake of medical
progress.
The early fruits of medical research were spectacular. The bacterial etiology of many diseases was
proved, resulting in cures never before the lot of mankind. Investigations of the use of X-rays to
see the previously invisible revolutionized diagnostic techniques. Experiments with various
anesthetic agents led to remarkable advances in surgery.
These experiments were largely conducted in public hospitals with the poor, with children,
women, prostitutes, the elderly – that is, with the disadvantaged, the downtrodden. Albert Moll,
in his remarkable book, Ärztliche Medizin, published in 1902, described many experiments
conducted with patient-subjects throughout Europe and the United States during the late
nineteenth century. He was particularly troubled by experimentation with the terminally ill, who
frequently served, as they still do, as subjects of research. Since they would soon die anyway,
learning from them seemed self-evidently the right thing to do. In reading these accounts my mind
turned again to the Aushcwitz subjects, who were also terminal cases – “lives not worth
living”—soon to be reduced to ashes.
Human research and its contributions to the advancement of knowledge captured the imagination
of doctors. The promise that omnipotence would replace the earlier struggle against impotence,
and the promise of fame, academic advancement, and perhaps even economic fortune, loomed
large in physicians’ minds.
But the intrusion of research into the clinical practice of medicine required keeping the two
enterprises separate. Patients went to doctors to be helped and not to serve as research subjects.
Crucial distinctions needed to be made between clinical care and human research for the
advancement of science. Instead, the boundaries between therapy and research became blurred.
The “therapeutic illusion” – that research would in some undefined ways benefit subjects –
contributed to this obfuscation.
Although physician-investigators were aware of the pain suffered by, and the occasional deaths of,
their patient-subjects, they did not consider whether they might be violating their Hippocratic duty
not to harm their patients. I shall return to this problem shortly. For now, let me note that this
history reveals antecedents to the concentration camp experiments. However different they were
in degree of torture and brutality, the experiments conducted by pre-World War II physician-
investigators, largely medical school professors, were precursors to what transpired at Auschwitz.
Medical students observed their teachers, read about their scientific investigations and their uses
and abuses of patients. Dr. Helmut Poppendick, one of the Nazi doctor defendants, put it this
way: “I knew [from my student days] that the modern achievements of medical science had not
been brought about without sacrifices.” Would the Nazi doctors have behaved differently without
that history? At least some of them might have paused and reflected had they been differently
educated.
When medical science and medical practice became intertwined, a new ethical question should
have been raised: Are physicians’ obligations to their patient-subjects different from their
obligations to their patients? But only a few remarkable physicians considered that question, and
their concerns were not heeded.
So far I have focused on the beginnings of objective medical science. I now want to turn to the
history of medical authoritarianism. The combination of the relentless pursuit of science, with its
inherent dangers of objectifying subjects, became embedded in the ancient tradition of medical
authoritarianism, with its inherent objectification of patients. Both dynamics make it difficult to
respect patient-subjects as persons with their own interests and rights.
In my readings on medicine from ancient and medieval times up to the present, I was impressed by
physicians’ awareness of their relative impotence, on the one hand, and their conviction that they
had something useful to offer to their patients, on the other. In the late seventeenth century, the
physician Samuel de Sorbière wrote that medicine “is a very imperfect science, quite full of
guesswork, and …scarcely [understands] its subject matter.” He was of two minds about whether
to be truthful with patients or to foster their unconditional confidence in their physician because
such confidence served the purposes of cure.
This conflict was generally resolved by encouraging physicians to be authoritarian – to demand
that patients be obedient and follow doctors’ orders if they wanted to be helped. “Should the
patient not submit to your discipline…do not persevere in the treatment,” said the physician Isaac
Israeli around 900 A.D. And the surgeon Henri de Mondeville wrote around 1200 A.D., “the
surgeon should promise that if the patient will obey the surgeon…he will soon be cured.” As late
as the mid-1950s, the influential sociologist Talcott Parsons observed: “[T]he doctor-patient
relationship has to be one involving an element of authority – we often speak of ‘doctors’
orders’.”
Any disclosures were limited to enlisting patients’ cooperation; otherwise, as Hippocrates had put
it, “[reveal] nothing of the patient’s future or present condition.” A patient’s blind trust was
considered essential, even though, beyond comforting attention and a few potions, physicians had
little to offer for the cure of disease.
In sum: Two precepts were handed down from generation to generation of Hippocratic
physicians: to avoid doing harm and to insist on silent obedience. The latter, in particular, had far-
reaching consequences for the conduct of research; for the same authoritarianism with which
patients had traditionally been treated in therapeutic settings was imposed on subjects of research,
who learned little, if anything, about the scientific purposes for which they were recruited.
Physician-investigators seemed oblivious to these moral issues and, if they were not, charged
ahead anyway. Ultimately-and, ironically, first in Germany – the state took notice and began to
regulate research. In 1900, Dr. Albert Neisser was put on trial after it became known that he had
injected serum from patients with syphilis into patients, largely prostitutes, suffering from other
diseases. The German academic medical community defended his conduct. Lawyers, on the other
hand, argued that “non-therapeutic research without consent fulfilled the criteria of physical injury
in criminal law.”
That same year, the Prussian Parliament enacted the first, limited state regulation of research. The
lawyer Ludwig von Bar, a consultant to the Prussian Minister, put it well: “Respect for rights and
morality has the same importance for the good of mankind as a medical and scientific progress.”
One hundred years later, his assertion is still being contested, and it was most flagrantly
disregarded by the Nazi doctors.
In 1931, the Weimar republic enacted regulations providing protection not only for subjects of
nontherapeutic research but also for patients receiving “innovative therapy.” The minutes of the
1930 meeting that preceded the enactment of these regulations record how the academic
physicians made light of what they called “rare” abuses, emphasizing instead the importance of
advancing medical science. Only Dr. Julius Moses, a physician and member of the German
Reichstag, argued for official guidelines to protect patients from dangerous experiments. His was
a lone voice among physicians.
The role of the state in the regulation of medicine raises complex questions that I cannot discuss
this morning. Note, however, that in the United States common law judges, not physicians,
promulgated the doctrine of informed consent in medical practice, giving some decision-making
authority to patients. Medicine has never created a regulatory framework for its practices, and this
lack of a structure may come to haunt us in this age of managed care and physician-assisted
suicide.
Michael Kater concluded his scholarly analysis of Doctors under Hitler with the observation that
“[I]t was in the interpersonal relationship between healer and patient that German medicine
corrupted itself [by contravening] the most important principle of the Hippocratic Oath…’I will
use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with view to injury
and wrongdoing.’” But as I have tried to demonstrate, the corruption Kater speaks of has a long
history. Moreover, the Hippocratic oath – a document that emphasizes physicians’ obligation of
caring attention toward individual patients – says nothing about the ethics of human research that
has relevance for an age of scientific medicine, unless one wants to invoke the oath to put a stop
to most research. Thus, after the dawn of the age of science, the medical profession failed its
members and its patients by not modifying its oath to reconcile its commitment to patients;
welfare with radically changed circumstances.
For many reasons, physicians have preferred to view human experimentation merely as an
extension of medical practice. In 1916 the Harvard physician Walter Cannon recommended to the
House of Delegates of the American Medical Association that it endorse the importance of
obtaining patient consent and cooperation in human experimentation. His proposal, however, was
not brought up for consideration. One influential physician observed, “it would open the way for a
discussion of the importance of obtaining the consent of the patient before any investigations are
carried on which are not primarily for the welfare of the patient.”
And this is only half the story. Disclosure in these contexts would require discussion with patient-
subjects of the uncertainties inherent in therapeutic medicine as well; and, if that were to happen,
the question would arise: Why should not patients be similarly informed? Physicians feared that
their authority to make decisions on behalf of patients would be undermined and patients’ best
interest would be detrimentally affected. Doctors viewed such prospects, as they still do, as a
threat to the traditional practice of medicine. They valued silence, their own and their patients’,
for silence maintains authority.
The Doctors’ Trial confronted the tribunal with aberrational, almost unbelievable, accounts of
what physician-scientists can do and justify when respect for human dignity is totally abrogated.
In its final judgment the tribunal went beyond these facts and articulated a vision of the limits of
scientific medical research that was clear and unambiguous. To be sure, its pronouncement would
eventually require elaboration and modification, but it was the uncompromising clarity of its
vision about the primacy of consent that proved so disturbing to the medical community.
The message of the tribunal might easily have been blunted by the confusing or inaccurate
allegations made throughout the trial. In his opening statement Telford Taylor, then chief counsel
for the prosecution of war crimes, charged the doctor-defendants “with murders, tortures and
other atrocities committed in the name of medical science.” But in his closing argument, James
McHaney, the chief prosecutor for the medical case, redirected the tribunal’s attention to what he
considered the nub of the case: “[T]hese defendants are, for the most part, on trial for the crime of
murder….It is only the fact that these crimes were committed in part as a result of medical
experiments on human beings that makes this case somewhat unique. And while considerable
evidence of a technical nature has been submitted, one should not lose sight of the true simplicity
of this case.”
Thus, was it a murder trial of ordinary criminals, who also happened to be doctors, or of medical
scientists (and medical science) whose conduct made them murderers? The ensuing and prolonged
disregard of the Nuremberg Code by members of the medical profession depended on their
answer to this question. Most focused on the barbarism of the Nazi doctors’ conduct and
concluded that the code was relevant only to Nazi practices but not to research in a civilized
world. They disregarded the fact that murder and torture were not the sole issues before the
court, that the permissible limits of scientific research were on trial as well.
The tribunal addressed both issues: “War crimes and crimes against humanity” and rules that must
be observed in the conduct of medical experimentation. With respect to the latter, the tribunal
observed that “medical experiments…when kept within reasonably well defined bounds conform
to the ethics of the medical profession.” But then the judges immediately asserted that “[a]ll agree
however, that certain basic principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal
concepts.”
The phrase “all agree” was confusing. Who were these “all”? Surely not the Nazi doctors, among
them some of the most distinguished German medical scientists, and surely not many physician-
investigators of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Nor do many contemporary medical
scientists embrace the tribunal’s principles. The confusion, I believe, had its origins in the
previously noted disagreement over the issues that required adjudication: All agreed with the
prohibition against murder and torture; but “all” did not agree with the tribunal’s “basic
principles” for the conduct of research.
Of the ten principles known as the Nuremberg Code, the first will be my focus here. It reads, “The
voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.” The judges did not, however, stop
there. Instead, they went to unusual lengths to define voluntary consent, in terms of both subjects’
capacity to give consent and the information that investigators must provide to subjects. It is the
detailed disclosure requirements which, I believe, the research community has found difficult to
accept. 
The judges wondered whether they had gone too far in imposing their legal views on the medical
profession: “Our judicial concern, of course, is with those requirements which are purely legal in
nature.…To go beyond that point would lead us into a field that would be beyond our sphere of
competence.” But if indeed they did venture “beyond [their] sphere of competence,” they were
compelled to do so. Whatever their ignorance of medicine’s needs, being American judges –
steeped in the self-determination ideal, so much celebrated in our political tradition – they wanted
their first principle to safeguard human dignity and inviolability, in research and civilized life.
The judges then shifted their focus back to the concentration camp experiments. This, too, proved
confusing, because it created the impression that their code applied only to the case before them,
that they were not addressing the entire universe of human experimentation. Yet, in their preamble
to the Nuremberg Code, they had suggested otherwise. There they spoke to this entire universe
when they averred that they wanted to promulgate “basic principles [that] must be observed in
order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts [in] the practice of human experimentation.”
This is my view of their intent. And this gives their pronouncements historic significance for the
post-Nuremberg conduct of experimentation with human beings.
In the most uncompromising language, the judges suggested in their first principle that the
tensions between progress in medical science and the inviolability of subjects of research must be
resolved in favor of respect for person, his or her self-determination and autonomy. Consent
became the necessary justification for the conduct of research, though not a sufficient justification.
In most of its nine other principles, the tribunal spelled out other conditions that must be met
before human beings could even be asked to serve as means for others’ ends. These conditions
include importance of the research question, prior animal experimentation, avoidance of
unnecessary or predictably disabling injury or death.
Critics have correctly observed that the first principle was irrelevant to the case before the
tribunal, for the basic problem with the concentration camp experiments was not that the subjects
did not agree to participate; it was the brutal and lethal ways in which they were used. But, in my
view, the first principle, like the rest of the code, did not speak to what transpired at Auschwitz; it
spoke to the future. The fact that with regard to Auschwitz the first principle was indeed
irrelevant, almost silly, is evidence of the judges’ broader objective. American judges are not
averse to going beyond the facts of a case; in this instance, I am glad that they did.
Another confusion was introduced by the medical experts for the prosecution, who asserted that
in the rest of the Western world, physician-investigators conducted their research according to the
highest ethical medical standards, including obtaining consent. I doubt that the judges believed
them. On cross-examination, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy was forced to admit that the first written AMA
code on human experimentation was enacted while the trial was under way, a fact he had tried to
hide on direct examination. Whatever the judges’ reactions to this testimony, they required little
convincing that the physician-investigators should not use human beings for research without
consent and, if they had done so in the past outside of Auschwitz, such practices should cease.
Their convictions on that point were only reinforced by the nightmarish stories they had just
heard.
The could not know that for decades their code would make little impact on research practices;
that many violations would continue to occur in the United States and elsewhere. For example,
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in which the lives and health of many African-Americans were
ruined, was not stopped until 1972. That study had been conducted by the U.S. Public Health
Service with 400 uninformed African-American men in order to gather data on the natural history
of untreated syphilis from its inception to death. The study should never have begun, and it surely
should have been stopped in the early 1940s when effective treatment for some of the late
manifestations of syphilis became available.
Or consider the experimental injection of live cancer cells into uninformed elderly patients at the
Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. Or consider the experimental injection of plutonium
into uninformed pregnant women to learn whether plutonium crosses the placental barrier,
conducted at a time when little was known about plutonium and its dangers. Or consider the total
body radiation experiments with terminally ill patients at the Cincinnati University Hospital. The
plutonium and radiation experiments were conducted ruing the Cold war and were justified on
grounds of national defense, an argument that had also been advanced by the Nazi physicians for
what they had done. Finally, consider more recent drug studies to determine the toxicity of new
cancer treatments, which were presented to patient-subjects not as research but as “new and
promising frontier treatments.”
These experiments were not comparable to the Nazi research, for care was always taken to keep
physical harm to a minimum, but neither do they meet the standards of the Nuremberg Code. As
one American research scientist put it, “I am aware of no investigator (myself included) who was
actively involved in research…in the years before 1965 who recalls any attempts to secure
‘voluntary’ and informed consent according to Nuremberg’s standards.”
In giving preeminence to “voluntary consent” in the conduct of research, the judges sought to
admonish investigators to become more respectful of subjects’ dignitary interests in making their
own decisions in interactions with investigators. Implementation of that objective remains the
unfinished legacy of the Nuremberg judges. For the regulations that now require consent will not
adequately protect the rights of subjects to self-determination unless physician-investigators
embrace these rights as a new Hippocratic commitment.
Vulnerable subjects are compelled by their necessitous circumstances to place their trust in
physicians whom they consider caregivers, not investigators. The problem of “trust” surfaced in
one of the studies conducted by the President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments during the Cold War, in which we assessed attitudes toward research among many
hundreds of patient-subjects who as recently as 1994 were enrolled in research projects. We
discovered that patient-subjects believed that “an [experimental] intervention would not even be
offered if it did not carry some promise of benefit for them,” and that therefore the consent
process was “a formality” to which they need not give much thought.
The lesson to be learned from our findings is clear: Consent will never be truly informed or
voluntary unless patient-subjects are disabused of that belief. Their rights can be protected only if
physician-investigators acknowledge that their patient-subjects view them as physicians and not
investigators, and that they, the doctors themselves, have the responsibility to challenge that trusty
in research settings. Patient-subjects must be told that their own and their physician-investigators’
agendas are not the same. Research is not therapy.
This is a formidable undertaking and a consequential one, about which I have written extensively.
It takes time, may impede research because of too many refusals, and may thereby make some
experiments impossible to conduct. Choices have to be made between the relentless pursuit of
medical progress and the protection of individual inviolability. The latter, however, will be given
the weight it deserves only if doctors learn to respect patient-subjects as persons with minds of
their own and with the capacity to decide for themselves how to live their medical lives. Their
choices may or may not include a willingness for altruistic self-sacrifice, but such choices must
take precedence over the advancement of science.
These are the conclusions to which my work has brought me. It all began with reading about
Auschwitz, which led me on a long journey, during which I learned much about what human
beings can do to one another in less egregious though still painful ways. Without my and my
people’s past, I might never have embarked on that journey.
In conclusion, I return to questions I raised somewhat differently at the beginning of this talk: Am
I doing justice or injustice to the victims of concentration camp experiments by placing their
suffering in the context of the historical processes by which they came about? Am I doing an
injustice to the victims by comparing their fate with that of other research subjects whose lives
were not reduced to ashes? Am I doing them an injustice, since violent death is always a tragedy,
to celebrate the Nuremberg Code that resulted from their suffering?
What is justice, what is injustice? A friend of mine once pointed out to me the repetition of the
word justice in Deuteronomy: “Tzedek, tzedek tirdof” (Justice, justice, shalt thou pursue). Such a
seemingly unnecessary repetition always invites commentary, and the one he heard was this:
“justice can never be adequately pursued only as a goal or an idea; it is also reflected in the means
employed.”
I have attempted this morning to employ the proper means, by comparing this tragic episode with
its past as well as with the present. And I have attempted to pursue justice – to do justice to the
victims – not merely by commemorating their suffering but also by construing the Nuremberg
Code 3 as their unwitting legacy. They were subject to coercion, sadism, and torture; the
Nuremberg Code celebrates freedom and human dignity.
As medical professionals, we remain unconvinced that we should embrace the code’s principles in
the spirit in which they were promulgated. It remains my dream that we shall do so. It may only
be a dream, but it comforts my nightmares.
